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SERGEANT MAJOR AYALA Y ESCOBAR AND
THE THREATENED ST. AUGUSTINE MUTINY
by W ILLIAM R. G ILLASPIE
n the morning of June 19, 1712, the Spanish presidio of
St. Augustine narrowly escaped a mutiny against the crown’s
constituted authority in Florida, Governor Francisco de Corcoles
y Martinez. The threatened uprising, which involved the governor’s second-in-command, Sergeant Major Juan de Ayala y Escobar, vividly illustrated the principal weakness in the colonial administration of Spanish Florida - the formation of a power structure headed by the sergeant major which continuously threatened
to undermine the power and authority of the governor. The
development of this extra-legal body, climaxed by the “sordid
affair” of June 19, took on added significance when viewed in
its broader historical setting.
The period extending from 1670 to 1713 was the first of
three critical phases in the eighteenth-century European rivalry
over North America. Beginning in 1670, England challenged
Spanish exclusivism in the southeast by founding the settlement
of Charleston. From Charleston English traders and settlers expanded westward and southward into the “debatable land” of
Georgia. The English and Spanish waged undeclared war for a
period of thirty years in which Gaule (eastern Georgia) served
as the principal battlefield. 1 Meanwhile, as France advanced southward into the Louisiana territory and toward the Gulf coast,
the Spanish crown having formerly ignored the area, ordered
the occupation of Pensacola Bay.
During the thirty-year interim the French and English intrusions appeared as giant pincers which threatened to engulf
the Florida provinces. Cognizant of this menace, Spain selected
St. Augustine, the seat of the governorship of Spanish Florida
since 1565, as the main bastion for defense and authorized
the building of a massive fort, the Castillo de San Marcos.
Work on this fortification commenced in 1672. Fortunately for

O

1. Verner W. Crane, The Southern Frontier, 1670-1732 (Ann Arbor,
1 9 5 6 ) , p a s s i m ; H e r b e r t E . B o l t o n , e d . , A r r e d o n d o ’s H i s t o r i c a l
Proof of Spain’s Title to Georgia (Berkeley, 1925), passim.
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Spain and its Florida dependency, the Castillo was completed,
or nearly so, by the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession at the turn of the century. 2
In 1700 the Hapsburg king of Spain, Charles II, died without an heir and willed the throne to Philip of Anjou, grandson
of the Bourbon French king, Louis XIV. The Hapsburg claimant
to the throne, Archduke Charles of Austria, challenged the will.
In the ensuing dynastic conflict, England, apprehensive over the
possibility of an eventual union of Spain and France under a
Bourbon monarch, supported the Hapsburg cause. This War of
the Spanish Succession extended to North America where it
became known as Queen Anne’s War.
In the southeastern campaigns of the American phase of
this international conflict, the giant pincers were now reversed.
The Franco-Spanish alliance now threatened to engulf English
Carolina. Indeed the French governor of Louisiana proposed a
joint Franco-Spanish offensive against Carolina with St. Augustine serving as the base of operations. But the plan was never
implemented and put into effect. Instead, the English and their
Indian allies, under the leadership of Carolina Governor James
Moore, seized the initiative and joined forces in an expedition
designed to strike and eradicate the Spanish bastion at St. Augustine. En route to Florida the expedition destroyed the few remaining Franciscan missions and the Spanish outposts in eastern
Georgia. Due largely to the defensive measures employed by
Florida Governor Jose de Zuniga y Cerda, Governor Moore
failed to wrest the Castillo from the Spanish. 3 However, most
of St. Augustine was burned and sacked, and many of the Indians who accompanied Moore’s expedition remained in Florida
to menace the Spanish populace.
By the time the newly-appointed governor of Florida, Francisco de Corcoles y Martinez, had arrived to succeed Zuniga
in 1706, the presidio of St. Augustine was the last vestige of
Spanish power in Florida. Corcoles would eventually regret
the day he set sail from Spain for Florida. During his ten year
interim as governor, St. Augustine reached its most impoverished
2. Albert C. Manucy, The Building of the Castillo de San Marcos
(Washington, 1942), passim.
3. Charles W. Arnade, The Siege of St. Augustine in 1702 (Gainesville, 1959), passim.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol47/iss2/5

2

Gillaspie: Sergeant Major Ayala Y Escobar and the Threatened St. Augustine M
T HE T HREATENED S T . A UGUSTINE M UTINY

153

state. The year following his arrival in Florida, he was writing,
“may God not permit the enemy to attack and find me without
supplies.” Conditions steadily worsened to the point that Corcoles
notified his superior, the viceroy of New Spain, in Mexico
City, that St. Augustine “kill be lost, not by enemy attack, but
by the delays in provisioning the presidio.” 4
For almost a decade the extent of the Spanish holdings in
Florida was the range of the Castillo’s cannon. In 1707, Governor Corcoles reported that those who dared venture without
protection into the forests to collect firewood, to care for small
patches of maize, or to dig for roots, were either killed or
carried off by the Indians. As a result, women and children, at
night and protected by the soldiers, ventured out from their
scant and unfurnished shelters surrounding the Castillo, and
walked sometimes as much as twenty to twenty-six miles,
north and south, in search of oysters, other shell fish, and roots.
By 1712 the St. Augustine populace had resorted to eating cats,
dogs, and horses. 5 Condiltions became so drastic that the governor violated mercantilistic restrictions and was forced to engage
in contraband trade, ironically enough with the enemy - the
English. The opportunity for such illegal trade arose during the
governorship of Corcoles’ predecessor, Jose de Zuniga. First
contact with the English traders occurred duing the exchange
of prisoners which followed the siege of St. Augustine. Soon
afterwards, however, the exchange became a one-way affair
with the Indians delivering Spanish captives, mostly soldiers, to
the governor at St. Augustine who paid the English commander
twenty pesos per captive. The amount was subsequently deducted
from the soldier’s annual pay. In the process of the exchange
the English envoy sold the presidio flour, beef, rice, and
hard-tack. 6
4. Corcoles to crown, St. Augustine, November 16, 1707, Archivo
General de Indias (cited hereafter as AGI) estante 58, cajon 1,
legajo 28/folio 23; April 25, 1712, AGI 58-2-3/56. All documents
cited as AGI from the John B. Stetson Collection, P. K. Yonge
Library of Florida History, University of Florida, Gainesville.
5. Ibid.; Corcoles to crown, St. Augustine, July 17, 1712, AGI 58-128/105.
6. Corcoles to crown, St. Augustine, 1712, AGI 58-1-28/103; July 17,
1712, AGI 58-1-28/105; July 24, 1712, AGI 58-1-28/106; Council
of the Indies to crown, Madrid, November 10, 1713, AGI 58-120/134; July 19, 1730, AGI 58-1-20/207; Benavides to crown,
St. Augustine, August 3, 1719, AGI 58-2-4/26.
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While Queen Anne’s War did not cause the poverty of Spanish Florida, it greatly aggravated conditions. The St. Augustine
presidio was almost completely dependent upon outside sources
for its supplies, including foodstuffs. The basic cause of the
economic privation of Florida was the inadequacy of the Spanish system to furnish the presidio with its needs. The crown
provided the presidio with an annual subsidy to be collected
from officials in New Spain (Mexico), the amount depending
upon the authorized strength of the presidio. By 1708 this was
355 men, and the annual subsidy amounted to 73,029 pesos.
Each year the Florida governor appointed a collector of the
subsidy, who, upon his arrival in New Spain, presented a certification denoting the authorized strength to the crown’s official
(until 1702 the official was the viceroy - afterwards the Bishop
of Puebla). The official then issued a warrant from the royal
treasury. Upon its receipt the Florida collector contacted merchants a n d p u r c h a s e d t h o s e s u p p l i e s r e q u e s t e d b y t h e
governor. The balance of the hard specie represented the pay
of the military personnel. 7
Theoretically the amount of the subsidy was adequate. However, it was often delayed and rarely was it paid in full. On
at least four occasions between 1708 and 1714, the collection
of the subsidies required from twelve to twenty-two months.
Further, the debts owed the presidio from previous subsidies
mounted steadily. By 1703 the subsidies in arrears had soared
to 456,959 pesos. Consequently, not only was the pay of the
soldiers delayed, but the Florida governor was also often
obliged to look to the Caribbean for supplies and foodstuffs.
In the last decade of the seventeenth century Havana served as
a source of supplies for Florida, and for several years merchants
there granted credit until the collector had returned to St. Augustine from New Spain. Since the Florida governor was not always able to meet his obligations with any degree of regu7. Luis R. Arana draws a distinction between the authorized and actual
strength of the presidio. Many of those listed among the authorized
personnel were incapacitated and unfit for soldiering. Luis R. Arana,
“T h e S p a n i s h I n f a n t r y : T h e Q u e e n o f B a t t l e s i n F l o r i d a , 1 6 7 1 1 7 0 2 ” (unpublished Master’s thesis, University of Florida, 1960),
passim. Recopilacion de leyes de los reinos de las Indias (Madrid,
1756), Libro 3, Titulo 9, Ley 7, 10; Benavides to crown, St. Augustine, January 20, 1719, AGI 58-2-4/21; crown to treasury
officials of Florida, Barcelona, March 8, 1702, AGI 58-1-23/131.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol47/iss2/5

4

Gillaspie: Sergeant Major Ayala Y Escobar and the Threatened St. Augustine M
T HE T HREATENED S T . A UGUSTINE M UTINY

155

larity, the Havana merchants became increasingly reluctant to
extend further credit. 8 These were the exigencies of Florida
which afforded Juan de Ayala y Escobar with the opportunity
to enhance his military career and estate.
Born in Havana in 1635, Ayala spent his early adult life
serving aboard merchant vessels in the Caribbean, and he familiarized himself with its trade routes, harbors, and channels. At
the age of forty Ayala married the daughter of the adjutant to
the sergeant major of the Havana presidio and decided upon a
career in the military. In 1683 he was assigned to the presidio
of St. Augustine where he served as lieutenant of the Castillo
with the corresponding rank of captain reformado (an honorary
rank without command of troops). During the next twenty years
Ayala often demonstrated his zealousness and bravery to the
Spanish crown and to the governors of Florida.
In the face of enemy attack and in command of unseaworthy
vessels, Ayala willingly sailed on numerous relief missions to
Havana, Campeche, and Vera Cruz at times when no one else
would dare volunteer. Where others failed, Ayala always seemed
to succeed. His voyages were not limited to the Caribbean; on
three occasions he sailed the stormy Atlantic, once without
protection of the convoy, to purchase goods and solicit the
crown of Spain for men, arms, and supplies desperately needed
9
for the preservation of Florida. In return for services rendered
during his second and third voyages, the crown rewarded Ayala
with promotions and commercial concessions. In 1687, during
8. Testimony relative to the payment of the subsidy for Florida, Puebla
de los Angeles, 1703, AGI 58-2-3/21; Corcoles to crown, St. Augustine, April 24, 1714, AGI 58-2-4/5; Quiroga to crown, St. Augustine, August 25, 1689; crown to Torres and treasury officials,
Buen Retiro, May 29, 1696, AGI 58-1-22/384.
9. Under contract with the Florida governor and treasury officials to
purchase designated provisions for the presidio, Ayala made his first
trans-Atlantic voyage in 1683, and returned to St. Augustine in
1685. During this voyage Ayala violated his license and committed
infractions against Spain’s commercial policy and laws. (House of
Trade to the crown, Seville, March 28, 1684, AGI 54-5-15, No. 4;
House of Trade to the crown, Seville, April 4, 1684, AGI 54-5-15,
No. 6; Governor Juan Marquez Cabrera to the crown, St. Augustine,
April 28, 1685. AGI 54-5-15, No. 16.) After reviewing the charges
against Ayala, the crown exonerated him from “whatever crime he
may have committed as he acted in good faith and brought aid,
thereby alleviating the misery of the presidio’s infantrymen.” (Crown
to the treasury officials of Florida, Madrid, April 7, 1687, AGI 581-22, No. 15.)
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Ayala’s second mission to Spain, the crown appointed him captain and commander of an infantry company. On his third
mission (1702-1705), which coincided with Moore’s siege of St.
Augustine, he secured desperately needed provisions and a promotion to the rank of sergeant major. Upon his return, according to the Franciscan friar Simon de Salas, the residents of
St. Augustine cried out in unison, “Ayala is the father of our
country because he has always helped us in our greatest
needs.” 10
Fully aware of his vital and seemingly indispensable role,
Ayala flagrantly violated virtually every law governing the conduct
of Spanish commerce and military personnel. Although prohibited
by the Laws of the Indies, his activities within the presidio were
more those of a merchant than a soldier. Ayala had adapted himself well to the underlying postulate of Spain’s commercial policy.
If a merchant was willing to undergo physical and monetary
risks, the government rewarded him with concessions and privileges from which he could profit. The crown and the governors
of Florida apparently classified Ayala’s activities as those of a
private citizen performing such vital services by provisioning the
provinces of Florida. Ayala’s most lucrative reward was his immunity from punishment.
Upon the return of Ayala from Spain in 1687, the governor
dispatched him on numerous local missions to procure supplies
on the presidio’s account. As commander of the presidio’s vessel Ayala also began purchasing goods on his own account and
proceeded to sell them to the residents of St. Augustine. Having converted his house into a store, he stocked dry goods such
as beaver hats and stockings for the soldiers and silk and fine
linen for their wives. He quickly learned that the basic necessities of life provided much more profit, and so he expanded
his inventory to include food products. Since the soldiers’ pay
was almost always in arrears, he had to devise means for them
to pay for the merchandise. With the governor’s approval Ayala
extended credit to the soldiers. When the subsidy collector returned from New Spain, he presented their signed vouchers, and
10. Junta of War to crown, Madrid, March 15, 1687, AGI 58-1-20/30;
AGI 58-1-22/7; Junta of War to Juan de Ayala y Escobar, Buen
Retiro, June 12, 1703, AGI 58-1-23/226; Quiroga to crown, St.
Augustine, April 18, 1692, AGI 54-5-15/89; Simon de Salas to
crown, St. Augustine, June 14, 1705, AGI 58-1-27/79.
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the governor would issue a warrant to Ayala for the total
amount, payable from the royal treasury. Treasury officials
would deduct this amount from the soldier’s pay. In 1689, Ayala
grossed 1,500 pesos from the sale of his goods. 11 The effects of
Queen Anne’s War yielded far greater profits for him.
Returning from Spain in 1705, Ayala found conditions in
St. Augustine even riper for self-aggrandizement. He was aware
that the soldiers and their dependents had but two alternatives:
they could subsist on their daily and meager rations of one or
two pounds of flour, shellfish, and roots, or they could purchase
food from one of Ayala’s well-stocked stores paying the exorbitant prices he charged. Ayala’s chief source of supplies was
Havana where one of his sons, Miguel de Ayala, and his agent,
Juan Francisco Carballo, were providing him with an ample supply of maize, flour, beef, and salt pork. For the convenience of
the St. Augustine residents, Ayala operated stores at two locations. One was managed by a local merchant, Jaime Barcelona.
The other was Ayala’s house, located on the main street, where
another local merchant, Manuel del Campo, was in charge. In
Havana he purchased two and one-half bushels of maize for
two pesos and sold it for nineteen pesos in St. Augustine; he
paid two pesos for twenty-five pounds of pork which he sold
to the residents of the presidio for nine pesos. Between 1706
and 1712 Ayala grossed a total of 70,000 pesos. 12 This amount
excluded his annual pay and freight charges on the goods transported for the presidio’s warehouse. Further, Ayala, with tacit
government approval, had succeeded in avoiding the payment of
import duties on the goods he transported on his own account.
The Florida treasury officials, responsible for the collection
of duties, reported this violation and Ayala’s other activities to
the crown. But instead of punishing the governor and Ayala,
the king castigated the treasury officials for their negligence: “I
severely reprimand and censure you for allowing the entry of
goods without payment of duty and yielding to my Governor
11. Treasury officials of Florida to crown, St. Augustine, July 20, 1689,
AGI 54-5-15/67.
12. Corcoles to crown, St. Augustine, July 12, 1712, AGI 58-1-28/104;
Council of the Indies to crown, Madrid, March 16, 1714, AGI 581-20/138; Francisco Menendez to crown, June 6, 1712, AGI 58-134/19; Benavides to crown, St. Augustine, January 20, 1719, AGI
58-2-4/21.
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and Captain-general in the matter of not confiscating these goods.
When you have knowledge of such fraud you are to act independently of the viceroys, presidents and governors. You are
hereby warned that should this occur again you will be severely
punished.” The king paused long enough in his caustic reprimand
to praise Ayala for the zeal he showed in volunteering for dangerous missions. 13 Because of Ayala’s vital role in provisioning the
presidio, Spain seemed reluctant to curtail his illegal enterprises
and activities. The Florida governors had an additional reason for
not interfering. Ayala wielded great power, real and potential,
within the hierarchic structure of the presidio.
The governors were peninsulares (Spanish-born) and were
usually sent out directly from Europe. Unfamiliar with conditions in Florida, the governors relied heavily upon the unofficial
presidio hierarchy, many of whom were criollos (American-born
Spaniards). Many of the latter had been born in Florida or
had served there for a long period of time. Because of Florida’s
impoverished condition, Spain found it extremely difficult to introduce new blood into the provinces. Except for the infrequent
arrival of soldiers as replacements, the society of St. Augustine
remained stagnant and closed. With the exception of the governorship, the criollos occupied all of the presidio’s key administrative and military posts: the sergeant major, the two treasury
officials (accountant and treasurer), and the company commanders. Governors came and went, but the power structure of the
criollos for the most part remained static. Fearful of retaliation
and reprisals at his residencia (a review trial of a royal official’s
term of office at which anyone could testify), the governors
usually sought and heeded the advice of the criollo hierarchy,
and they oftentimes overlooked their infractions of the Laws
of the Indies. 14 Within the criollo hierarchic structure, the
the sergeant major, in his official and extra-legal capacity, was the
most dominant and powerful figure. In his official role, the sergeant major was the governor’s second-in-command. In the
event of the death or absence of the crown-appointed governor,
13. Crown to treasury officials of Florida, Madrid, July 20, 1689, AGI
54-5-15/67.
14. Quiroga to crown, St. Augustine, June 8, 1690, AGI 54-5-12/110;
August 1689, AGI 54-1-26/1; Córcoles to crown. St. Augustine,
July 12, 1712, AGI 58-1-28/104; July 17, 1712, AGI 58-1-28/105;
Benavides to crown, Augustine, August 3, 1719, AGI 58-2-4/26;
January 1, 1721, AGI 58-2-9/11.
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the sergeant major became interim governor until the crown
named a replacement. Sergeant Major Ayala frequently reminded
the presidio populace of this possibility, and he informed them
that should he become interim governor, he would appoint his
eldest son, also named Juan de Ayala, as interim sergeant major. In his unofficial capacity the sergeant major, a criollo himself, was looked upon as the leader and spokesman of the
criollo populace. 15 Equally significant was the development of an
unavoidable web of kinship among the presidio hierarchy - a
factor which would have a direct bearing on the successful
challenging of Governor Corcoles’ authority in 1712.
Sergeant Major Ayala was related to the three company commanders of infantry. He was related by marriage through his
first wife, Magdalena de Uriza, to Captain Francisco Romo de
Uriza, and to his brother, Captain Joseph Sanchez de Uriza. The
third company commander was the sergeant major’s own son,
Captain Juan de Ayala. 1 6 Moreover, while none of the positions within the military or administrative hierarchy was supposed
to be hereditary, theory and practice diverged.
Members of the Menendez family had held the post of accountant, one of the two treasury officials, for over a century
and a half. In 1673, Tomas Menendez Marques succeeded his
father as accountant, and he remained in office until his own
death in 1706. Meanwhile, he had trained his son, Francisco
Menendez, as his successor, and as the only qualified person
the latter became interim accountant. Five years later the
crown confirmed the appointment, and Francisco Menendez maintained the accountancy for at least another twenty years. Hoping
to retain the acountancy in the family indefinitely, Francisco
vainly solicited the crown, in 1720, for permission to appoint his
successor. 17
The relationship among the criollo hierarchy was not always
cordial and harmonious. The Ayala and Menendez families had
15. Corcoles to crown, St. Augustine, July 12, 1712, AGI 58-1-28/104;
Menendez to crown, St. Augustine, June 12, 1712, AGI 58-1-34/19.
16. Corcoles to crown, St. Augustine, July 12, 1712, AGI 58-1-28/104;
July 17, 1712, AGI 58-1-28/105.
17. Ayala to crown, St. Augustine, April 22, 1692, AGI 54-5-15/90;
Juan de Pueyo to crown, St. Augustine, October 20, 1706, AGI
58-1-28/11; Corcoles to crown, St. Augustine, March 20, 1711,
AGI 58-1-28/94; Menendez to crown, St. Augustine, February 23,
1720, AGI 58-1-34/29; July 16, 1722, AGI 58-1-34/37.
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been feuding since 1685, when Tomas Menendez first reported
Ayala’s illegal activities. Until 1712 the governors had supported
Ayala whenever a dispute arose between the antagonists. One
such occasion arose in 1692 when Governor Diego de Quiroga,
in defending Ayala against charges made by Tomas Menendez,
chided the accountant and called him meddlesome and overpaid
for the amount of work he did. 18
Under Governor Corcoles this situation changed. Relations between Corcoles and Ayala were strained from the time the
governor arrived in 1706. Although dependent upon the sergeant major for provisions, Corcoles frowned upon his sale of
goods to the presidio’s residents. Relations between the two
deteriorated even more when rumors began to spread that the
governor was receiving a percentage of Ayala’s profits in return
for not interfering with his enterprises. On the other hand,
Ayala resented the governor’s purchases of foodstuffs from the
English traders; he regarded such trade as unfair competition
to his own enterprises. It was Ayala’s subtle attempt to halt
the contraband trade with the English that led to the showdown
between the governor and the sergeant major on June 19, 1712.
In a letter addressed to Dr. Villas, a resident of Mexico
City, Ayala piously asked for advice concerning the propriety
of permitting the heretical English envoys to enter St. Augustine
in order to return prisoners and conduct trade. Ayala knew the
information would be brought to the attention of the governor’s
superior since Villas was the brother-in-law of the viceroy of
New Spain. On June 18, Governor Corcoles received a dispatch
from the viceroy ordering him to explain the illicit trade with
the English. That same day Ayala returned from Havana in the
presidio’s only vessel loaded with food, most of which was on his
own account. Corcoles decided to use the occasion of taking
muster the next morning in order to denounce Ayala and confiscate his goods.
At eight o’clock on Sunday morning, June 19, 1712, the
governor ordered all those drawing pay from the annual subsidy
to gather at the main guard house * where muster would be
* Located just south of the Castillo de San Marcos in St. Augustine at
the foot of the bridge, on the west side, spanning the Mantanzas River.
18. Crown to Quiroga, Buen Retiro, June 25, 1690, AGI 58-1-22/146;
Quiroga to crown, St. Augustine, April 18, 1692, AGI 54-5-15/89.
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taken. The soldiers quickly provided a table for the official recording and chairs for the governor and the few clergymen
who wanted to attend. The principal figures included the two
treasury officials, Captain Francisco Menendez Marques, accountant, and Captain Salvador Garcia de Villega, interim treasurer;
Ayala; the three company commanders of infantry; the company
commander of the cavalry, Captain Joseph Primo de Rivera; and
Captain Bernardino Nieto de Carvajal, interim commander of
the artillery unit.
As soon as Captain Rivera had completed taking muster,
Governor Corcoles ordered the soldiers to break ranks, sit down,
and form a semi-circle around him. With biting sarcasm the
governor began his brief talk: “Gentlemen, I have ordered you
to gather around close in order to tell you that His Excellency,
the Viceroy of New Spain, has been informed by the Father of
the Poor of this presidio, who is present, that I have permitted
trade between all of you and envoys of St. George [Charleston]
when they brought prisoners. The one who informed him of
this was Sergeant Major Juan de Ayala. He, you know, is the
one who has such compassion in his heart for the poor, that
he acclaims himself as the Father of the Poor. In lamenting
your suffering, he is selling you a pound of salt pork for three
reales, and a pound of beef for two and one-half reales. This,
gentlemen, is the Father of the Poor. Now, he says his son
[Miguel de Ayala] will shortly send a sloop from Havana with
a cargo of food valued at between 4,000 and 5,000 pesos.
With this, he will remedy the plight of the poor as he has
so often done. You should be thankful for these good works.
But this I want you to know. I have in no way taken part
in his transactions with you. I would rather continue digging
roots in order to survive, or perish.” 19
When the governor finished, no one uttered a word. Corcoles
rose from his chair, walked over to the treasury officials, and
told them to issue extra rations for the following day - that
additional food would be available once the sergeant major’s
goods were confiscated. While they were still talking, Ayala approached the governor, and without addressing him as “Your
Excellency,” curtly requested permission to mount the guard.
19. Corcoles to crown, St. Augustine, July 12, 1712, AGI 58-1-28/104.
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Before Ayala could turn to issue the order, Corcoles snatched
the baton, the symbol of the sergeant major’s rank and authority, from Ayala’s hands and turned it over to Senior Captain
Francisco Romo de Uriza. He then ordered Ayala’s arrest on the
charge of not having addressed him with proper respect. “That’s
the way I heard it,” the accountant, Francisco Menendez, echoed.
Ayala, in a burst of temper, turned to Menendez and shouted,
“neither the king nor the Laws of the Indies require me to
call him, His Excellency.” 20
Again, Corcoles ordered Ayala’s arrest and directed two
sergeants to take him to the Castillo prison. Captains Romo de
Uriza and Sanchez de Uriza interceded, pleading with the governor to rescind his order. The sergeants had not moved. Ayala
walked away remarking that he needed no one to escort him to
prison. “Besides,” he called back, “‘the king will have me out
in no time.” Corcoles, shouting the order a third and fourth
time, lunged toward Ayala. Captains Romo de Uriza and Sanchez
de Uriza tried to physically restrain the governor by grabbing and
holding on to his arms. Again, they urged him to countermand his order. Captain Juan de Ayala imformed Corcoles that
he had simply failed to hear his father address him as “Your
Excellency.” But before the governor could answer him, Francisco Menendez remarked: “Since you were not even present,
how do you know?” With that Captain Ayala and the accountant began arguing and drew their swords. 21
Governor Corcoles, still being restrained by his company commanders, lamented, “How could you do this in my presence?”
Suddenly, Sanchez de Uriza released the governor’s arm, drew
his sword, and shouted “Long live Philip V.” Ten soldiers drew
their swords and responded, “Long live Philip V and our governor.” Pandemonium broke loose for fifteen minutes. Those around the governor lifted him onto the table where everyone
could see that he had not been harmed. When the shouting
subsided, the fatigued governor stepped down from the table and
asked for a drink of water. Meanwhile Romo de Uriza walked
over to the sergeant major, who had stood motionless during
the fifteen minutes of bedlam, and handed him the baton that
he was carrying. In a gesture of all was forgiven, Ayala and
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
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Corcoles embraced, and the governor invited the treasury officials
and officers to accompany him to his house. When all were
seated in the living room, the governor turned to his officers
and said, “I have done nothing which would discredit my honor
in the eyes of the viceroy. Surely, my shabby dress would indicate that.” The sergeant major explained that he had not
written the viceroy directly and had simply asked for advice
concerning the wisdom of allowing envoys from Charleston to
enter St. Augustine. The viceroy, Ayala insisted, must have assumed that illicit trade was taking place. 22
Governor Corcoles learned a valuable lesson that Sunday
morning. The measure of his power and authority would be
determined by the will of the criollo hierarchy. Of course, Corcoles
never forgave Ayala for his correspondence with the viceroy’s
brother-in-law and the threatened mutiny. Through the testimony
of others the governor reported the incident and pleaded with
the king to transfer Ayala and his son to Havana. The governor
justified his request on the grounds of Ayala’s insubordination, his
activities as a merchant, and his old age. Corcoles reported that
Ayala was now seventy-seven years old and incapable of performing the duties of a sergeant major. 23 The crown’s response
was not what the governor had anticipated. Instead of ordering
an investigation of the illicit trade with the English and Ayala’s
activities, the crown stressed but one point - the inability of
Governor Corcoles to command the respect and obedience of
his men. The crown’s solution to the presidio’s maladies and
the reoccurrence of another “sordid affair of June 19” was the
immediate replacement of Corcoles. The king’s procrastination
in naming a successor delayed the “solution” for three years.
Finally in 1716, Pedro de Olivera y Fullana arrived in St.
Augustine After having served only three months, Governor
Olivera died, and Sergeant Major Juan de Ayala became interim
governor of Florida. 24
Now saddled with the responsibility of governing the province,
Ayala’s activities as entrepreneur and merchant ceased. During
22. Ibid.
23. Council of the Indies to crown, Madrid, November 10, 1713, AGI
58-1-20/134.
24. Council of the Indies to crown, Madrid, November 10, 1713, AGI
58-1-20/134; November
1 1 , 1 7 1 3 , A G I 5 8 - 1 - 3 0 / 2 5 ; M a r c h 16,
1714, AGI 58-1-20/138; 1716, AGI 58-2-1/1.
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the two years in which he served as interim governor, correspondence from the officials and residents of St. Augustine to
the crown was generally free of complaints. The most serious
charge was Ayala’s frequent illnesses and old age. He continued
his predecessors’ practice of trading with the English, only more
openly now that peace had been restored and after having consulted the presidio hierarchy. Ayala’s principal accomplishment as
interim governor was his success in winning back the loyalty of
many of the Indian chiefs who had defected to the English. 25
Spanish justice, which moved in slow and mysterious ways,
finally caught up with Juan de Ayala. In 1718 Antonio de
Benavides arrived at St. Augustine to replace Ayala. An overly
zealous reform governor, Benavides immediately conducted an
investigation which led to the brief imprisonment of Ayala in
the Castillo prison and to his eventual exile to Havana. The
sergeant major could no longer depend upon his former supporters. Between 1712 and 1718 new family alliances had been
formed. The sergeant major’s wife, Magdalena de Uriza, had
died; Captain Romo de Uriza had married a sister of Accountant Francisco Menendez; and Captain Sanchez de Uriza had
married the accountant’s sister. Governor Benavides was assured
of having adequate supporting testimony in his charges against
Ayala.
Ironically, the governor’s charges had nothing to do with
Ayala’s business enterprises or his insubordination. Rather, the
governor charged Ayala with having carried on contraband trade
with the English while he was interim governor of Florida.
The case against Ayala began in 1718 but was not resolved
until 1731. The crown concluded that Ayala was technically
guilty, but because of inadequacies in the normal channels of
trade, he and the former governors of Florida were justified
in trading with the English. The charges against Ayala were
dropped. Unfortunately for this entrepreneur, he would not
live to witness his exoneration. In 1727 Juan de Ayala y
Escobar died at the age of ninety-two. 26
25.

Clergy of St. Augustine to crown, St. Augustine, November 29,
1716, AGI 58-2-14/73; Ayala to crown, St. Augustine, November
22, 1717, AGI 58-1-30/66; Council of the Indies to crown, Madrid,
July 19, 1740, AGI 58-1-20/207,
26. Benavides to crown, St. Augustine, August 12, 1718, AGI 58-1-30/
79/80; Council of the Indies to crown, Madrid, July 19,1730, AGI
58-1-20/207; Crown to Benavides, Seville, March 2, 1731, AGI
58-1-24/230.
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